An economic comparison between the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone and the Export Processing Zones in Asia. by Fong, Yun-kong Robert. et al.
2AN ECONOMIC COMPARISON BETWEEN THE
SHENZHEN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE AND
THE EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES IN ASIA
BY







of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
THREE-YEAR MBA PROGRAM








TABLE OF CONTENTS III
LIST OF TABLES IV







(B) Resource Utilization 7
SECTION (II)
Export Processing Zones (EPZ) in Asi;
93 BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE EPZs
4 AN OVERVIEW OF ASIA's EPZs----------------- 12





(F) Thailand 19(G) Philippines 20
(H) Taiwan 21
(I) Korea 24
5 SUMMARY ON THE EPZs' ACHIEVEMENTS 25
(MODEL BUILDING)
SECTION (III)
China and its Special Economic Zones (SEZ)
6 THE GEOGRAPHICAL& ECONOMIC 31
DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA
7 THE SEZ DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 34
8 THE SHENZHEN SEZ 37
(A) The History and Overview 37
(B) Geographical Environment 39
9 THE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS AND THE 41
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN SHENZHEN SEZ
A) The Economic Systems 41
(B) The Economic Growth 46
SECTION (IV)
The Comparison
10 A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SHENZHEN 50
SEZ AND THE EPZs IN ASIA
(A) Objectives comparison 50
(B) Quantitative comparison 51
(C) Qualitative comparison 52








1 Geographical Spread of Asia's EPZs 10
Comparison of EPZs in Asia---2 26a
(Performance after 5 years)
Comparison of EPZs in Asia---------------3
(Favorable VS Non-favorable Conditions)
4 Comparison of EPZs in Asia
26b
(Regulations)
Distribution of China's Capital---------5 33
Investment by Selected Areas by Period
6 Foreign Investment in Shenzhen 44
by Form by Year
7 44Percentage of Share of Foreign
8 Breakdown in Foreign Investment in 47
Shenzhen by Sector 1979 to 1983
Summary on Shenzhen SEZ's Industrial 489
and Economic Growth
A Comparison Chart to measure the-- 5310
Level of Ingredients of Successful
EPZ that Shenzhen has
A Comparison Chart to measure the----- 5411
Level of Ingredients of Unsuccessful
EPZ Shenzhen has
26C










The idea of EPZ actually originated from the concept of
Free trade zone, which was established in some advanced
industrial countries, such as the U.S., as early as
1930's. After mid 70's, the development of EPZ in Asia
grew rapidly and the number of EPZs in Asia gradually
surpassed those in the western world. Even though EPZ is
the generic term used commonly, other names such as Free
Export Zone, Investment Promotion Zone, Industrial
Estate, etc. have been used quite often by different
countries. They do, however, carry more or less the same
set-up objectives. There are four major objectives which
we will discuss in Chapter 3 of this report.
In third world countries, the most attractive feature
about setting up an EPZ lies in its contribution to the
country's modernization. These countries realize that in
the journey of developing the nation, they need to have
foreign capital, technology, and overseas markets. If
they can provide a small area whereby they can give
special incentives to foreign investors in terms of
political, economic, and financial flexibility, they will
attract the investors to establish some industries in that
area. In that way, not only the countries can earn
foreign exchange, provide more job opportunities, and
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develop more overseas market links, they can also speed up
the nation's industrial modernization via Technology
Transfer- The upmost important objective of setting up an
EPZ in an underdeveloped country.
The establishment of EPZ also created some problems to any
country. The more common ones are: conflict of interest
between the EPZ and the other industrial zones of the
country. Normally the one country two systems approach
in terms of political and economic administration does not
always operate in harmony. The other ones would be
bureaucracy and collusions. All these side effects will
more or less affect the success/failure of the EPZ which
will be summarized in the later section.
Since the proposal of setting up the four Special Economic
Zones (SEZs) in China was approved in the Chinese People
Representatives Congress in August 1980, there have been
numerous documents and articles published to discuss the
different aspects of the four Special Economic Zones.
With the continued progress of the SEZs in the last few
years, reports that describe the economic status,
industrial investments and urban construction, of the SEZs
and papers that comment on their success and failure can
be found in numerous sources. There have been, however,
very few books and articles which try to compare the four
China SEZs with the other existing SEZs in different parts
3of the world. Such comparison would be very interesting
and meaningful because all SEZs in the world share the
same commonality to a certain extent. And yet, due to the
diversities in cultures, economic needs and types of
governments, they are different in their set up objectives
and the results yielded.
This paper tries to compare the ShenZhen SEZ with other
Export Processing Zones (EPZ) in Asia. Comparisons will
be made on their initial objectives, their quantitative
and qualitative economic achievements. In order to assure
that we are measuring the same variables, we will use the
result reached at the end of the 5th year period after a
zone has been established for comparison. From these
comparisons, we hope to find out whether China SEZ are
more efficient than the other EPZs and why they are so in
some areas.
In so doing, the paper will be divided into 5 sections.
Section I will give a brief introduction of the content
and a description of the methodology used in this research
paper. Section II gives an overview of the SEZs, or
rather EPZs (Export Processing Zones) in the other parts
of Asia. Also provided is a summary on the major
achievements of these EPZs. Section III will analyze the
developmental stages of Chinese economy and explain why
how the SEZ concept can be materialized. For the sake of
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convenience, we will use ShenZhen SEZ as the representing
zone. Emphasis on this section will be placed on the
economic growth of the ShenZhen SEZ, which will be used to
compare with other EPZ's in Section IV. Section IV gives
a comparison between ShenZhen SEZ and the other EPZs in
terms of regulations and economic performances etc. From
the comparison, we hope to draw some conclusions
concerning the results of the ShenZhen SEZ.
Finally, in the concluding section, we then will include




In the following, we shall specify the kind of resources
that have been obtained, the way they are gathered and
utilized.
(A) Resources:
There are mainly two methods in obtaining the
necessary resources.
1. By searching existing information
Types of information Sources


















Newspaper Clippings from Far East
Economics
Reviews




We have also conducted a few interviews with
people who work in China, government officials,
foreign investors. Their comments are of high
value since they are not easily located in any
7
documents. In fact, we have found that even
published data are not very reliable as they
tend to be different from one source to the
others.
(B) Resource Utilization:
In addition to obtaining the resources as described
above, we need to strategise how to use them. In
Section II, we will investigate the development of
the EPZ in Asia. After analyzing the information
gathered, we will eventually draw a conclusion on why
some EPZs are successful and why others are not. In
this way, 2 models are built, namely, the
Successful EPZ model and the Less Successful EPZ
model. In Section III, when the Shenzhen SEZ is
compared with the EPZs, it is actually a comparison
basing on the models built in Section II. In fact, a

















The Background and Development
of Export Processing Zones (EPZs)
in Asia
According to The United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO), the definition of an Export
Processing Zone (EPZ) can be written as Industrial Free
Trade Zones as Incentives to Promote Export Oriented
Industries). The concept of such definition involves
the establishment of modern manufacturing plants inside an
industrial estate by offering a suitable package of
investment incentives to both foreign and domestic
entrepreneurs. Export Processing Zones (EPZ) is by no
means new in Asia. Since the establishment of the first
EPZ in Ireland back in 1956, countries in Asia have
embarked on their own program of setting up EPZs. Among
them, Taiwan and India were the first ones to start in the
sixties. As to the SEZs in China, the focus of this
study, they are new comers. By 1987, 12 countries in Asia
have their own versions of EPZ or SEZ in operation.
Table l shows the geographic spread of the zones
1 See Bibliography
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South Asia S.E. Asia North Asia
No. No. No.
Sri Lanka 2 Indonesia 2 Taiwan 3
India 2 Malaysia 10 Korea 2
Pakistan 1 Philippines China5 4
Bangladesh 1 Thailand 1
No. of zone: 6 18 9
Table 1 Georgraphical Spread of Asia's EPZs
Both Hong Kong and Singapore are more appropriately
classified as free ports, and are excluded from the
tabulation above. While the objectives of these countries
in setting up SEZ or EPZ are not exactly the same, they
nevertheless resemble each other in many aspects. The key
objectives listed by most are:
1) To attract foreign investments
2) To promote and develop export
3) To create job opportunities
4) To facilitate transfer of technology
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Some countries are very successful in fufilling the
objectives for their EPZs, while others are not flaring as
well. Those succeeded have since evolved into a more
sophisticated phase of economic development. A case in
point is Taiwan, which has one of the most successful
records for its EPZs(the first EPZ is Kaoshiung opened in
1966). The success has led to labor shortage and
escalated land cost. In the mid 1970's, the government
shifted its emphasis to capital and technology intensive
industries for further economic development. The original
EPZ has been modified with the establishment of
science-based industrial parks offering investment
incentive to high-tech industries. In the mean time, the
tax holiday previously enjoyed by many traditional labor
intensive industries in EPZ are waived so as to discourage
further investment in such industries.
Malaysia, likewise has enjoyed great success with its 10
EPZs. Since the early 80's, new applications for
investment in these EPZs are no longer accepted. The
government had in the early 1980's moved preference for
setting up new zones in the east coast as an attempt to
develop the backward economy there.
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CHAPTER 4
An Overview of Asia's EPZs
Due to the differences in backgrounds and history among
the EPZs, it is unnecessary and irrelevant to present a
detailed account of all major zones in Asia. Instead, a
summary highlighting the current status of the major EPZs
is given below. It is intended to serve as a basis for
comparison with the Shenzhen SEZ in P.R. China in the
later chapter of this report.
(A) Sri Lanka'
The investment promotion zone located at Kathunayake
is close (29 km) to the capital city of Colombo. It
has started operation since 1979. The zone was
targeted as a key to the government's strategy of
investment promotion. As such the incentives offered
are practically the best anywhere in the region. A
10-year tax holiday on corporate and personal taxes
and 99-year lease period are among the many
incentives offered. Unskilled labor is in abundant
supply at low-cost. Yet with an literate rate of
80%, they are early to train.
* The country information are adpoted from 2.
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Owing to the strong support from the government, the
zone is comparatively free of red tape for a
developing country. Greater Colombo Economic
Commission (GCEC) is the only authority overseeing
the zone, thus allowing all required processing be
organized through it efficiently.
The zone has enjoyed considerable success. In the
first three years of operation, total export derived
from the zone was Rsl.4 billion with 20-25% domestic
value added. By the end of this period, about 62
factories were either in production or under
construction. Labor intensive light industries are
the prime investors in the zone.
The second zone at Biyagama, 14 km from Colombo, had
been planned to come in operation by 1984-85. It is
specifically catered for those industries with heavy
demand for water. No solid data is yet available to
allow a meaningful assessment on its performance.
One constraint to-the steady development of the EPZ
in Sri Lanka is the political turmoil which has been
with the countries since the early 80's.
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(B) India
India has two EPZs: the Santa Cruz Electronics
Export Processing Zone (SEEPZ) which started in 1974
and the Kandla Free Trade Zone (KFTZ) in Gujarat,
which started in 1985.
SEEPZ
As the name implies, the target of the SEEPZ is to
promote exports of electronics-related goods. It's
located 35 km from Bombay and 6 km from Santa Cruz
Airport. As EPZs were apparently not a central
element of the country's development strategy, there
has been a lack of enthusiasm from the government on
promotion. This resulted in low level of
participation from overseas investors. In the first
eight years of operation, less than 40 units were in
place with many of them barely functional. The
bureaucratic management style of SEEPZ is blamed for
its disappointing performance of the zone. In
addition, the incentives offered to investors are not
at par with other rival countries in the region.
KETZ
The Kandla Free Trade Zone (KFTZ) is located on the
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west coast of India, at Gujarat State about 10 km
from Kandla Port. While its start-up dated back to
'65, the poor infrastructure had seriously
discouraged investors' interest. Only until 1980,
with the rise of a new state government has KFTZ
turned-around. Establishment of flight service,
improved train services and regular port of call for
Kandla were the key factors contributed to revival of
the zone. Before the port of call was inaugurated at
Kandla, most of the import and export from KFTZ had
to route through Bombay which is 800 km away!
Fiscal incentives are essentially the same as in
SEEPZ. Government Soft Loan and 15% subsidy on fixed
capital investment are added attractions. The red
tape was nevertheless also similar to the SEEPZ.
(C) Pakistan
Pakistan is a relatively late entrant in setting up
EPZ. The Karachi Export Processing Zone (KEPZ)
started operation in '84. It is situated near the
Karachi Port and Karachi International Airport. The
initial promotion theme for KEPZ was its proximity to
the consumer markets of the Middle East. The
incentives offered include a 5-year tax holiday,
after which only 25% of normal tax is required within
16
the zone for the next 5 years.
KEPZ has fell victim to the diminishing interest in
the Gulf market where imports have declined as a
result of weak oil prices. This is further
complicated by the major problem of disagreement
between government department in Pakistan about rules
governing the zone. Thus results in the said
incentive package being less attractive than those
offered by the competing countries.
Against the original forecast that some 400 factories
would be established by 1987, with annual export of
US$125 million, only 15 factories had actually been
commissioned with total export since start-up
amounted to only US$17 million (1984-87).
(D) Indonesia
Indonesia has two major EPZs. One is located at
Jakarta's Tanjung Priok harbor, known as Pelabuhan
Nusantara, and another one at Batam Island. These
zones in fact closely resemble Bonded Warehouses in
practice than EPZs, with few special incentives
provided to investors in the zone. Concessions such
as tax exemptions and tax holidays must be negotiated
with the Investment Board according to individual
cases.
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The advantage of investing in these zones are that
there are less red tape than outside the zones,
although it is still considerable as compared to the
other rival countries.
Pelabuhan Nusantara
The zone is 11 hectares in area. It is close to
Jakarta with its convenience in banking and
transportation. Export-oriented and labor-intensive
light manufacturing are the types of investments
encouraged by the authority.
Batam Island
The Island is 20 km southeast of Singapore. The
initial objective of developing Batam Island is that
it would benefit from the business spillover from
Singapore due to its proximity. Furthermore, it was
considered as an alternative for labor-intensive
industries that no long found Singapore attractive
because of substantial escalation in labor and land
cost.
The zone offers a six-year tax holiday plus other
incentives for export-oriented business.
Nevertheless, due to inadequate infrastructure for
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which improvement has been slow to come by, the
Island is less than successful in attracting
investments as planned.
Majority of the companies operating on the Island are
in the petroleum support industris. Their
establishment was due to change in government
regulations few years ago requiring relocation of
Bonded Warehouse inside the country from Singapore.
Otherwise, voluntary investments on the Island has
been below expectation.
(E) Malaysia
Malaysia has more than 10 EPZs located primarily
along the west coast and in the south. They are in
the States of Penang, Selangor, Malacca, Johore and
Kedah. All the EPZs are strategically located near
airports or ports and average only five miles from a
port of entry.
High-tech and resource-based industries are the
preference in the EPZs by the government. Unlike
many other rival countries, the incentive granted to
investors in Malaysia's EPZs are not standard. It is
linked to the type of industries, and the evaluation
is conducted by the authority on a case-by-case
basis.
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Malaysia's EPZs are highly successful with most of
them fully occupied. Total investment exceeds US$200
million, with more than 60,000 people employed by
factories inside the zones. Labor shortage has in
general become a problem. This prompted the
government to shift its priority to the less
developed east coast since the early eighties.
(F) Thailand
The only EPZ in Thailand is located in an earlier
established Industrial Estate at Lard Krabang. The
country also has a number of other industrial estates
and investment promotion zones that offers nearly as
attractive incentives and good infrastructure. They
are however not catered for export-oriented
industries.
Lard Krabang EPZ is 30 km from Bangkok port and 35 km
from the Don Muang International Airport. The zone
is 28 hectares in size. Export-oriented business
especially those using Thailand's low-cost labor and
processing Thai raw materials are welcomed.
Labor-intensive electronic industries are also
encouraged investment targets. The zone was opened




The most established EPZs in Philippines are at
Bataan, Mactau and Baguio, with few other zones
developed more recently in Cavite and Davao City.
The government categorizes zone industries as
specially treated enterprises and has reduced red
tape to the minimum. The Philippines labor force is
an important asset which made its SEZs remain
attractive for labor-intensive industry. Despite the
set-back caused by political turmoil in recent years,
low wages and productive work force are its strength.
Other incentives offered in the zones are
nevertheless not as competitive as elsewhere. For
example, a comprehensive tax holiday is not
available.
Bataan Export Processing Zone (BEPZ)
It is the most developed EPZ in the Philippines.
Located at 160 km' from Manila in the Southern tip of
Bataan Peninsula, it has an area of 350 hectares.
Light, medium and heavy industries are all preferred
investements in the zone.
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Mactan Export Processing Zone (MEPZ)
MEPZ is located on the Mactan Island in the province
of Cebu in central Philippines. The zone has 119
hectares and is adjacent to the Mactan International
Airport. From Manila, it takes 1 hour flight time.
Mactan is a regular port of call for both
inter-island and ocean going vessels.
Factories engaged in light manufacturing operations,
with raw materials and finished products particularly
suited for air shipment are of primary interest to
the zone authority.
Baguio City Export Processing Zone (BCEPZ)
BCEPZ is a 63 hectare site located in the highlands
of Luzon Island, 250 km north of Manila.
Electronics, precision instruments, and other
high-tech enterprises are preferred as their output
can easily be airfreight out from Baguio.
(H) Taiwan
Taiwan has three EPZs, all of them have relatively
long history. The one in Kaohsiung opened in 1966,
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the other two in Nantzu and Taichung followed in
1969. The zones had reached their prime in the
1970's, and all three are now fully occupied.
The key incentive originally offered to all companies
in the EPZ was a five-year tax holiday. By 1974 the
authority restricted the said incentive to only those
investors meeting the criteria for encouraged
industries. However, all enterprises in the EPZs
still retain some incentives such as 25% income tax
ceiling and exemption of import tax on raw materials
and machineries. This signified the government's
emphasis on a shift towards capital and
technology-intensive industries following the huge
success enjoyed by the EPZs in the early seventies.
Towards the late 70's, the original EPZ concept was
further modified with establishment of science-based
industrial parks providing special incentives for
sophisticated industries. For example, the Hsinchu
Park offers a five-year tax holiday with a four-year
grace period and a 22% corporate tax ceiling for the
eligible investors.
Kaohsiung EPZ
Taiwan's oldest EPZ is located in Kaohsiung, the
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largest industrial city of the country. It is 7 km
from Kaoshiung airport and 12 km from Kaohsiung port.
The zone is fully occupied with over 100 firms in
operation.
Taichung EPZ
Located in the middle of Taiwan's west coast, 16 km
from Taichung airport and 26 km from harbor. It is
also fully occupied with about 50 firms.
Nantzu EPZ
Located 26 km from Kaohsiung airport and 24 km from
Kaoshiung port. It's at fully occupancy with over
100 factories.
In all three zones, the permitted industries are
similar and listed below. It is an evidence of the
government's effort in discouraging low value added
industries:
Precision machinery and instruments, electronics,
opticals, metals, furniture, electrical and office
appliances, yachts, mobile homes, food, cosmetics,
leather and rubber products.
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(I) Korea
Korea has two EPZs, the Masan Free Export Zone and
Iri Free Export Zone. The preferred investors are
those industries with definite export prospects, high
foreign exchange earnings, and advanced knowhow.
Owing to the generally favorable business climate and
much less red tape, the zones have been successful in
attracting investors. As such, attracting additional
companies to the zone is no longer a high priority
with the government.
Masan Free Export Zone
It's located 185 miles southeast of Seoul and 30
miles west of Pusan Port, has an area of 233 acres.
The zone is fully occupied with about 100 firms in
which Japanese companies predominate. Tax
concessions are virtually the same as those
applicable to firms with foreign investments outside
the zone.
Iri Free Export Zone
120 miles southwest of Seoul and 15 miles east of
Kunsan, has an area of 78 acres. Conditions are
similar as in the Masan Zone.
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CHAPTER 5
Summary on the EPZs' achievements
In gathering data for the summary, it is discovered that
some EPZs are so new that sufficient data and even general
information are lacking. They are Thailand, Malaysia and
Pakistan. Of these three countries, Malaysia's EPZs are
known to be successful whereas her Pakistan counter part
is considered to be a complete failure. Due to its
overemphasis on the Middle East Market, when the oil
prices dropped, the economy in Pakistan's EPZ began to
deteriorate rapidly.
Apart from the above three countries, we are able to
collect data for seven EPZ's in six countries and
summarize them into 3 tables. The 7 EPZs in these three
tables are:
1. Katunayake Investment Promotion Zone: Sri Lanka
2. Santa Cruz Electronics EPZ: India
3. Pelabuh Nusantara EPZ: Indonesia
4. Bataan EPZ: Philippines
5. Nantzu EPZ: Taiwan
6. Kaohsiung EPZ: Taiwan
7. Masan EPZ: Korea
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Table 2 measures each of the seven EPZs' economic
achievements at the end of its 5th year period after
establishment. Data are still missing from India,
Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The key indicators in this table
will be the "Return on Investment" and the
"Export/Worker", which will be discussed later.
Table 3 gives a summary of the favorable conditions as
well as the unfavorable conditions of each EPZ based on a
comparison of EPZs in different countries.
Table 4 is a simple matrix on all the
incentives/regulations provided by each EPZ. Again, most
information are valid through the end of the 5th year
period after establishment of the zone, which is our
comparison basis.
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COMPARISON OF EPZ'S IN ASIATABLE 2
( PERFORMANCE AFTER 5 YEARS)PLACE
TAIWANTAIWAN KOREAINDIAITEMS (INDONESIA (PHILIPPINESISRI-LANKA
KAOSHIUNGPELABUH NANTZU MASANBATAANSANTA CRUEZNAME OF EPZ KATUNAYAKE
ELECTRONICS NUSANTARAINVESTMENT
EPZ EPZ EPZ EPZ EPZPROMOTION EPZ
START-UP YR 1987 1974 1969 1969 1966 1970
1974
AT THE END OF
5TH YR.
1. YR. EXPORT US$54.3M 9.3M 11M 92M 345M 235M
72. INVESTMENT US$88M 63M 65M 89M
RETURN ON
INVESTMENT 0.125 1.46 5.3 2.6
3. NO. OF 70 38 20 22 100 147 100
FACTORIES
4. NO. OF 35000 2500 7000 6000 15000 42500 20000
EMPLOYEES
?EXPORT/WORKER US$1550 3720 1833 6130 8118 11750
MAJOR EXPORTS GARMENT VIDEO FIRMS PRECISION LIGHT IND'L NON POLLUTING NON FERROUS
ELECTRONICS MAGNETICS MACHINA NON-LABOR INTENSIVE METAL
RECORDINGS RIES ELECTRONICSELECTRICALS
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COMPARISON OF EPZ'S IN ASIATABLE 3
FAVORABLE VS NON FAVORABLE
CONDITIONS
TAIWAN TAIWAN KOREA(INDIA (PHILIPPINES(SRI-LANKA (INDONESIA NANTZU KAOHSIUNG
HIGH INCENTIVES GOOD LITTLE RED LOW COST LABORVORABLE STABLE GOVERNMENT SKILLED LABOR
RESIDENTIAL TAPE PRODUCTIVE HIGH SKILLED LABOR PROFESSIONALS
ABUNDANT LABOR AREA WORKFORCE COMPLETE INFRA-
GOOD INFRA- FREE CURRENCY STRUCTURE
STRUCTURE FLOW MANY PROFESSIONALS
GOOD INCENTIVES LITTLE RED TAPE
POLITICAL BUREAU- LITTLE OTHER SHORT LAND HIGH LABOR TURNOVER LABOR COSTINSTABILITY CRATIC INCENTIVES LEASE HIGHVORABLE PARTIES CHANGE LITTLE NO LAND OWNER-
TOO FREQUENTLY INCENTIVES SHIP
• LIMITED' IND' L HISTORY OF POWER SUPPLY,
BASE LABOR FREQUENT












16.5-27.5%25% MAX25% MAX30- 40%NEGOTIABLENANACORP.
INCOME TAX
555NIL10TAX HOLIDAY I5 (NEGOTIABLE(YR)
AUS420/MONTHUS=5.1/MUS4,95/MUS46/MRENT IN 1982
lush=a/rsPER SQ M.
NA ANA15LAND LEASE YR. 99 5.30 (NEGOTIABLE
NO NONO 0YES NA NADOMESTIC MKT.
4.5LABOR COST/DAY US$1.00 US$1.00 US$1.5 4.0 4.0
FULL LIQUID.OTHER NO TAX FOR AFTER TAX INCOME PERSONAL
INCENTIVES 5 YRS. OF ASSETS l00% INCOME
2% EXPORT NA WITHIN TRANSMITTED OUT TAX
INATAX AFTER 48 HRS. 15% OF INVESTMENT WAIVED
5 YRS. 5% CAN BE TRANSFERRED FOR 1ST
EXPORT TO OUT AFTER 3 YRS. 5 YRS.
DOMESTIC MKT. FOREIGNER







In table 2, two indicators are used to measure the
achievements of the EPZs. The Return on Investment
measures the return on every dollar invested. At the end
of the 5th year period, the 3 zones in Taiwan and Korea
all had a positive return of over US $1 to $5.3.
Philippines has a return of US$0.125, which is a
questionable one to us. The other three countries
(Indonesia, India and Sri Lanka) do not have enough
investment data to support any conclusion.
To complete the comparison, a second indicator,
Export/Worker is used. It is similar to the
Income/Capita used in the economic measurement of a
country. From the results shown, we can see that there
appears to have a 3-way distribution. Taiwan & Korea lead
the rank with US$6,000- 12,000, India comes in second
with an achievement of US$3,720 per capita, The third
class will be Sri Lanka and the Philippines, with
Export/Worker only at US$1,550-1,833.
Although we cannot make conclusion about the level of
achievements of Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, and
Philippines due to insufficient data, we can say that
Taiwan and Korea are standing away from the rest of the
team in the above 2 quantitative measurements. An initial
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conclusion would be: It takes a ratio of greater than 1
on the "Return on Investment" and an "Export/Worker" of
over US$6,000 to be a successful EPZ.
From the available results which include the quantitative
analysis from elsewhere similar to the above, Taiwan
Korea always represent the successful model of EPZ.
Pakistan and Indonesia always appear to be the
unsuccessful EPZ due to its wrong market target
(Pakistan's Middle East Market became to be wiped out when
oil prices dropped) and the absenc of enthusiastic
government support (Indonesia). The performances of some
EPZs, like India, Philippines and Sri Lanka are
questionable. From Table 3, we can see that these
questionable ones have more unfavorable conditions for
investments. Most of them are government related, such as
: political instability, bureaucracy, and the lack of
attention from government. On the other hand, Taiwan
Korea have strong support from the government, have enough
skilled labor and professionals, good incentives for
investors, and complete infrastructure etc.
If we also look at Table 4, a comparison on all the
regulations/incentives provided by each EPZ, we find that
both Taiwan and Korea have clearly spelt out incentives,
although some may not be as attractive as that of other
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EPZs'. The less successful EPZs are normally ambiguous
about regulations probably due to the weakness and
administrive insufficiency of the governments. For
example, Indonesia states that most regulations are
"negotiable". This will create the chance of having
collusion during the negotiation, and hence stopping
investors from dealing with the EPZ.
From the tables above, we try to draw a successful model
of EPZ basing upon the Taiwan and Korean profiles, and a
less successful on using India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and
Philippines as the basis.
(A) Successful EPZ Model: (figures measured at the end
of the 5th year period)
- Export/Worker greater than US$6,000
- Return on Investment greater than 1, preferrable in
the 2 to 5 range
- Good geographical location
- Politically stable
- Government support with long term development
Policies clearly spelt out
- Strong local administrative organization
- High incentives
- Abundant low cost labor, professionals
- Availability of base industries and infrastructure
30








It seems that the EPZ failure are mostly contributed by
political factors rather than physical conditions of
zones.
In the second part of this paper, we will use the two
models to apply to the China Shenzhen SEZ. The purpose is
to identify whether Shenzhen bears any characteristics of
A or/and B stated above. Hopefully we can discuss its
achievements/failures/future in relation to the two models
above.
Section (III)




The Geographical and Economic
Development in China
China has been an agricultural country in the last 4000
years. The industries in China was still in its infant
stage at the turn of the century. Before the take over of
red China in 1949, China had been developing its
industries along the coastal lines from Northeast to
Southeast. More than 70% of its industrial development
took place into this belt shape area. The inland and the
areas adjacent to the Soviet Union had been largely
ignored. This kind of economic development imbalnace was
noted by the People's Republic of China and efforts were
made in shifting the industrial development back to
inland. There were basically 2 reasons. One was that PRC
did not want to have too many eggs in one basket. Second
being the country needs to diversify and to fully utilize
its unused, undeveloped abundant natural resources to
better the lives of the poor population.
From 1952 to 1978, China went through its 4 5-year
economic plans. The emphasis to shift the locality of
industrial development was noted. In table 5 on Pg. 33,
we can see that the% of total Capital Investment in China
was increasing steadily in inland during the 4 5-year
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economic plan, whereas the investments in the coastal
areas were decreasing. The reasons for this change lies
in the convenience of using inland mining in developing
heavy industries and the need to strengthen. national
security for establishing military industry in inland
(ShiChuan). During these 26 years, the coastal areas'
economic development was virtually in a static stage
eventhough the output value still maintained. From 1979
on, China set out its open door policy after the Gang of
Four was wiped out and Deng Xiao Ping took power. The
necessity to invest into the coastal cities to attract
foreign investors to fulfil the open door policy suddenly
changed the China's economic emphasis 1800 back from
inland to coastal. From the same table, we can see that
coastal investments were rising back from 42.5% in the 4th
economic plan to 47.89% in 1979 and maintained 50.84% and
49.31% in 1982 1983, respectively. The set up of the 4
Special Economic Zones in the Southern part of China and
the 14 open cities along the coast were the results of the
shift in economic policy. This established the background
for the development history of China's economy.
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lst 2nd 3rd 4th
FYP FYP FYP FYP
Year 58-62 66-70 71-75 79 8211953-57 83
Coastal 46.65% 44.13 31.51 42.53 47.89 50.84 49. 31
Inland 53.35% 55.87 68.49 49.1657.47 52.11 50.69
5
Table 5 Distribution of China's Capital Investment by
selected areas by period
FYP= Five Year Plan
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CHAPTER 7
The SEZ development in China
The idea of setting up the SEZ in China did not come
abruptly. It was cultivated during the mid 70's when the
Chinese Government gradually realized that they needed to
shift the heavy investment in inland back to the coastal
areas. In table 5, we can see that the coastal investment
during 71-75 was 42.53%, compared to the 31.51% in 66-70.
This move was also implemented to cope with the Four
Modernization proposed in early 70's. After the death of
Mao Tse Tung, the implemenation of the four modernizations
was formally written into the Communist Party's 11th
National Party Congress in 1977. In August 1980, the 5th
National People's Congress approved the establishment of
China's first SEZ in Shenzhen. And the name "Special
Economic Zone" was confirmed for the first time. During
the congress, the then General Secretary of the Communist
Patry Zhao Zi Yang officially outlined the principles and
the spirits of open door policy. The setting up of the
four special economic zones (Shenzhen, Zhouhai, Shantou
and Xiamen) was an outcome of the 1980 congress. It is
interesting that in the beginning, the SEZ's setup was
rather local and the Central government was rather passive
in exerting administrative control. It was in 1982,when
the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher visited
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Beijing to negotiate the return of Hong Kong after 1997,
that the Chinese government began to involve more actively
in the policy setting, monitoring, and even publicizing
the SEZ, especially in Shen Zhen. Most scholars believe
that it is a strategy of China to turn Shenzhen into a
beachhead toward modernization and Capitalism, and to
provide a smooth transition for Shenzhen to cope with the
systems in Hong Kong. Hopefully, when China takes over of
Hong Kong in 1997, Shenzhen will have its system already
developed to be in syncronization with Hong Kong. If this
strategy is successful, similar tactics will be used for
the return of Macau, and eventually Taiwan under Chinese
Soveignty.
So the implication of setting up SEZ in Shenzhen is more





It was on the penisula of Shekou located west of
Shenzhen, that the development of Shenzhen SEZ
started. In 1979, the China Merchants Steam
Navigation (CMSN) Company Ltd. of Hong Kong was
seeking a deep water harbor for its expanding
ship-breaking business and its huge metal melting
furnance, for doing so was not physically possible in
Hong Kong anymore. The company approached the China
State Council to propose that they would invest into
Shekou. The proposal was subsequently approved by
the Council and CMSN was given 2 sq km of land in
Shekou and was asked to invest US$5M to start the
project. This was the first foreign investment
project after the open door of China in 1979.
Encouraged by the success of this project, the Central
government made a move to include the Shekou area
into the Shenzhen SEZ when the policies were set up
in 1980. The zone has 327 sq km of land. It was
originally a quiet border town with very few
residents. Even in the beginning of the development
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stage, the state government only estimated to build
the town into a moderate size with approximately
200,000 to 300,000 residents at the end of this
century. But by 1985, the census showed that
Shenzhen already had 191,000 residents. This did not
include the 146,000 from other provinces who live
there temporarily.
The development of Shenzhen can be briefly divided
into the following stages.
(i) Established the initial urban planning:
Shenzhen had invited some 100 specialists to
participate in this initial phase of development
Launched a large scale construction of city(ii)
facilities and other basic infrastructure
Draft the special administration laws for the(iii)
SEZ which included import/export, tax laws,
company laws, joint venture laws and technology
import laws etc.
(iv) Established a new administration government




















0 5 10 15
Existing urban settlement
Initial size of the SEZ
The enlarged portion of
the SEZ










endowed the local government with more
authority and flexibility in operation.
(v) Started to attract foreign investments and
foreign technology through joint venture (JV)
establishments.
Developed other basic industries to support the(vi)
high-tech transfer.
In order to attract more labor, the Government(vii)
differentiated the income level of SEZ workers
from the rest of the country. People in general
had a higher living standard in Shenzhen SEZ.
Such large scale development started in 1981 resulted
in a big wave of investments from outside. At the
end of the first half of 1985, the total JV signed
accumulated to 4087 with actual investments
accumulated up to US$700 million.
(B) Geographical Environment
Shenzhen is located in the Southern part of the China
coastal lines. It belongs to the Bo'an county and is
attached to Hong Kong's New Territories. Shenzhen is
the largest SEZ out of the four already established
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SEZs in China. The climate of Shen Zhen is much like
Hong Kong's, being hot and humid in the summer, dry
and cool in the winter.
In fact, not only does Shenzhen resemble to Hong Kong
in terms of climate, it also has a lot of basic
infrastructure which either relies on Hong Kong or is
built according to the blue prints of Hong Kong.
For example, its electricity supply is from China
Light Power in Hong Kong the highways are the
continuity of Hong Kong's Shenzhen needs to use Hong
Kong's container port for large scale ocean shipment
its banking facilities are closely tied in with the
Hong Kong banks. They also connect and share the
telecommunication with Hong Kong on telephones, telex
and fax. Needless to say, the residents there are
largely of the same species of Hong Kong, i.e.-




The Economic System the Economic
Growth in Shenzhen SEZ
(A) The Economic Systems
The economic systems in Shen Zhen are largely
based on foreign investments attracted in by the
different level of incentives. In order to suit
the needs for different types of business, the
local government developed some very creative
ways of letting the foreign investors do
business in Shenzhen. There are 5 types of
industrial investments.
(i) Processing trade:
The investors consign raw materials, or
semi-finished products to the Chinese to
assemble and package the goods according to
the investors' specifications. The
investors are charged with processing fees.
(ii) Compansation Trade:
The Chinese partner is responsible for
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providing factory buildings and labor,
while the foreign investor supplies
production equipment, technology,
management personnel even raw materials
if necessary. The foreign partner is paid
by installments by means of the products
produced for his equipment, technology etc.
until the investment is all paid off. The
equipment will then belong to the Chinese
partner. The foreign investor normally
will have the right to buy any further
products at an agreeable discount price for
his overseas markets.
(iii) Contractual Joint Venture:
The Chinese partner provides land, natural
resources, labor etc, while the foreign
partner will provide key equipment,
materials, management etc. The liability,
rights and obligations are spelt out in the
contract. Revenue, profit and loss are
also distributed according to the terms and
conditions in the contract.
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(iv) Equity Joint Venture:
This form of JV is similar to the above,
except this takes the form of a limited
liability corporation with the status of a
legal entity. Under the Chinese Law on
Foreign Investment, the shares of foreign
participants shall in general be not less
than 25%.
(v) The 100% owned foreign subsidary
During the first five years of the SEZ
operations, most investments took place in
the form of compansation trade and
processing trade. This is largely because
the confidence of the outside investors had
not been established. And among the two
types of Joint Ventures and the 100% owned
foreign subsidiary, the statistics showed
that the latter one had the least
percentages and the equity JV came in
second with contractual JV being the most
propular one. Table 6 shows the details:
Form of
Investments 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 total
Equity JV 7 4 13 11 92 127
Contractual JV 30 24 47 14939 289
100% owned NIL 185 8 13 44
foreign subsidy
Processing Trade 133 270 508 517 624 2052
/compansation
Trade
TOTAL 170 303 578 583 878 2512
Table 6 Foreign investment in Shen Zhen by forms by year
Within the JV, theoretically speaking, the
foreign partners have no maximum shares as long
as they can meet the minimum requirement of 25%.
In the real life, however, they are seldom
allowed to occupy more than 50%. Table 7 shows
the statics:
1979 - 1983% Foreign ownership in JV
11%51 to 99% owned
30%50% owned
59%Less than 50% owned
% of share of foreign ownership in JV fromTable 7
1979 to 1983
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The lack of confidence of foreign investors is
not ungrounded. In the first few years, the
Chinese government imposed the laws stating that
the chairman of any JV must be Chinese that the
Chinese managers must get equal pay as the
foreign managers that there are more foreign
exchange control and that there will be several
deduction on profits before the money can be
remitted out. Furthermore, the fact showed that
the JV in China seldom made a profit over 20% in
those few years. Another implication is that
foreign partners in most technology JV would be
more interested in doing processing technology
in SEZ rather than in product technology. This
was due to the fact that 100% ownership
investment was hard to approve and that the JV's
normally experience more Chinese control than
they would like to see. The net of all that is
China did not see as much technology transfer in
high-end product as they expected from their
foreign partners.
To clear the smoke, in late 1986, Chinese
government announced 22 rules to further
deregulate the investment restrictions. This
should have a positive effect on the investment
climate.
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To sum up, the incentive package that Shenzhen
SEZ gives to outside investors is as follows:
(1) Corporate Profit Tax 15%
(2) Tax Holiday 1 to 5 years
(3) Labor Wage About US$100
per month






(5) Rent on Land US$30-100 per
sq m per year
(6) Lease Term 20-50 years










Rl The Economic Growth of Shenzhen SEZ
Shenzhen SEZ differs from other EPZ at least in
one aspect, i.e. the variety of business the SEZ
has. The following table shows the breakdown in










Table 8 Breakdown in foreign investment in
Shen Zhen by sector 1979-1983
To measure the results of the Shenzhen SEZ is
not an easy task. The main reason is that data
are not easy to obtain and there is not a
central source that can confirm the correctness
of the data. We managed to obtain some data
from 1979 to 1983, in the following table.
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1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
No. of agreements 170 303 578 583 878
signed
Gross output US$ NA NA 65. 1M NA 195M
Actual Investment 15.4M 30. 1r 76M 113M 145M
US$
Return on NA NA NA0.85 1.35
Investment
No. of factories NANA 267 NA 443
NA NA NANo. of workers 12000 ?5000
NA NAOutput/worker US$ NA 5417 17800 1
9 10 11
Table 9 Summary on Shenzhen SEZ's industrial
and economic growth
From the table, we can see that the SEZ did not have
an impressive start, much of the investment dollar in
industries was not realized until 1982-83 time-
frame. For example, in 1981, the return on
investment was still running at a below 1.0 level,
meaning a loss of money. In 1983, the number rose to
1.35, which is close to the same figure for Taiwan's
successful Nantsu EPZ at the end of the 5th year.
The productivity measurement was high since the
beginning. In 1981, it already reached a respectable
level of US$5,417 per worker, indicating that the
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effectiveness of Chinese labor is on the average
higher than most other EPZ's. It also means that
Shenzhen should be a good choice for labor intensive
jobs.Becasue of the ethnic ties with the Hong Kong
and overseas Chinese, more than 80% of the investment
money were from Hong Kong or through Hong Kong. Of
course, the continued expansion of Hong Kong export
industry and the limitation of land usage, high
salary drove many Hong Kong manufacturies to invest
in Shenzhen and move the low-tech jobs there. This
China/Hong Kong leverage benefited both the China and
Hong Kong export performance. In fact, Hong Kong set
a record high of 33% increase in year to year export





A comparison between the Shenzhen SEZ
the EPZ's in Asia
(A) Objective Comparison
In section II Chapter 3, we stated the primary
objectives of setting up EPZs in Asia. They are
repeated as follow:
(i) To attract foreign investments
(ii) To promote develop export
(iii) To create job opportunities
(iv) To facilitate transfer of technology
Shenzhen SEZ bears all the above 4 objectives
when setting up the zone. But our research from
many documents also shows that there is an
underlying political objective for setting up
the SEZ which is as important as the above four.
Shenzhen SEZ is actually a laboratory to test
the capitalistic system in a communist country.
If successful, this will be implemented to the
rest of the nation starting from the other
coastal citites.
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Another objective which is also political is
that the SEZ serves as a test ground for the
unification of the overseas Chineses and the
Hong Kong Chinese. This is proven successful
when one looks at 80% of the foreign investments
in Shenzhen was from Hong Kong or overseas
Chinese.
The ultimate objective, however, is to develop
the SEZ strategy so that one day Taiwan can be
reunited under this system.
(B) Quantitative Comparison
In Section III Chapter 5, we created 2 models.
One is the so called "Successful EPZ Mode"l, and
the other one is the "Less Successful EPZ




At the end of the 5th year period after
establishment.
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This was based on the figures of Taiwan Korea
EPZs, which we consider to be successful in
Asia. We then look at the same figures from
Shenzhen:
1.35 on the return on investment in 1983
and
US$7,800 on the output/worker in 1983
The figures in fact come very close to the ones
for Nantsu in Taiwan. We can say that the
Shenzhen SEZ clearly stands out from the
Philippines, India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and
resembles much to the the initial stage of Masan
in Korea, Kaohsiung and Nantsu in Taiwan, a very
strong start.
(C) Qualitative Comparison
Again, if we refer to the 2 models built in
Chapter 5, we can do the following.
53
Successful EPZ Shenzhen SEZ
Good Geographical Location Yes
Political Stability Yes since 1979
Government Support with Yes,
long term development incentive












Yes, on laborAbundant Low Cost Labor
No, onProfessionals
professional
Base Industries Moderate /
infrastructureInfrastructure
good
Table 10 A Comparison Chart to measure the Level of
ingredients of successful EPZ that ShenZhen has
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Unsuccessful EPZ: Shenzhen SEZ
Government Lack of Interest No
No, so farChanging Political parties
stable
Shortage of Management Foreign hired
Labor disruption No, not
allowed
Bureaucracy Yes, to some
degree
Red tapes Not much
Table 11 A Comparison Chart to measure the Level of
ingredients of unsuccessful EPZ ShenZhen has
From the above comparison, Shenzhen is in most
areas carrying the successful model's





Fortunately, the local government has been
trying very diligently to resolve these
problems. More and more professionals are being
assigned in the SEZ from SZE Chuan, the military
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base, and the Northeastern part of China, which
is known as the heavy industry base. The fact
that Shenzhen has recently loosened its
restriction on foreign management to China also
helps easing the first two problems. Although
it is unavoidable to have bureaucracy in any
government especially in such a big country, the
Chinese government continues to try hard to
reduce the level of it. In 1986, 22 rules were
announced to lessen the restriction and paper
work for foreign investors. This is an
indication that the government is still
euthusiastic in building the SEZ to a success.
With the current thrust that China has, one
should view that the Shenzhen SEZ will continue
to grow positively.
(D) Other Observations
There are some other characteristics of Shenzhen
SEZ observed during the research but were not
noted when-comparing Shenzhen with the 2 models.
One observation is that Shenzhen SEZ markedly
differs from other EPZ in terms of its domestic
market opportunities. Most investors doing
business in other EPZs are with the hope that
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the products can be made cheaper and hence have
stronger competitiveness when being shipped and
sold in oversea markets. Seldom do they think
of opening up the host country's market. In
contrast, almost all investors in Shenzhen hope
that one day they can sell what they make in
Shenzhen to China. This is certainly not a
silly dream considering China has a vast market
potential.
Second observation is that most EPZs are oriented
toward manufacturing only. Shenzhen is
different.
Table 8 gives us a breakdown on the different
types of business people invested in. Shenzhen
in fact is more of a multi-sector manufacturing
and service industry SEZ. This is a new concept
and has never been found in other EPZ in the
initial set up stage.
The third observation is that the investments
have been mostly confined to Chinese Sources.
We were not able to find any other EPZ in Asia
attracting investment capitals from its own
nationals. Even though the oversea Chinese do
not live in PRC, they share the same ethnic ties
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with China. It is much easier for the
government to convince them rather than the
westerners to invest. The success of Shenzhen
SEZ was of course also contributed by the
China/Hong Kong leverage package offered to the
Hong Kong industrialists.
Lastly, a minor finding is that most EPZs do not
have a fence or restricted border for their
citizens to commute to work daily. In Shenzhen,
it is different. Almost all Chinese workers are
assigned to work there from elsewhere and they
live in factory-provide domitories. The Chinese
mentality of being afraid of losing face when
they get fired and return to the homeland makes
labor workers work harder. This probably tells







The strongest part of Shenzhen SEZ is that it has a very
independent local government to support its growth. The
development of SEZ always get central government's
attention. Shenzhen also resembles other successful EPZs,
such as Taiwan's and Korea's, in the area of having well
developed infrastructure, cheap and disciplined labor
force, and quite attractive incentives etc. Above all,
Shenzhen has the utmost advantage of having Hong Kong as
its next door neighbour. Needless to say, the cordial
relationships between the British and the PRC governments
provide lots of convenience to Shenzhen.
Telecommunication network, highway systems, container
port, airport, management, capitalistic mentality,
efficiency, pace- all provide great infrastructural help
for Shenzhen to move faster than other EPZs. Without Hong
Kong being in its proximity, Shenzhen would not have
achieved what it is now.
But Shenzhen is not without its weaknesses. From personal
contacts with investors, people who work there, and
Shenzhen government officials, there are several areas the
SEZ has to improve.
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The need for longer and broader eye sight for local
government:
considerations more on the Nation's benefits rather the
SEZ's
Lack of knowledge of modern business practices and
international laws
Too much verbal agreements, creating unnecessary
mis-intepretations
Weakness in planning and coordination
Insufficient laws in governing the growing complex
business nature
Bureaucracy
Quality of labor for high-tech
Lack of management
Need to open up domestic market quicker
We do not expect to see all these changed tomorrow. With
the strongest asset, the enthusiasm from the government,
and the sincerity and flexibility for change, the future
of the SEZ looks bright. The General Secretary, Zhao
ZiYang's visit to Shenzhen recently further confirms the
determination of the government to improve the system and
to make Shenzhen a success story. What it then needs is a
stable political system and consistent policies, along
with the foreign investors' mutual understanding and
patience. One should be confident that Shenzhen can become
another successful EPZ such as Taiwan's or Korea's, in the
foreseeable future.
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Deng Xiao Ping once said, "SEZ is a window, a window for
technology, a window for knowledge, a window for
management, and a window for open door policy".
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